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Seminal Texts and Overviews

Contemporary Texts

Acquaintance and Epistemology

  • Atiq, Emad. (2021). Acquaintance, knowledge, and value. Synthese, 199, 14035–14062.

  • Atiq, Emad. (2025). Knowledge by Acquaintance and Impartial Virtue. Philosophical Studies 182 (3):911-937

  • Atiq, Emad. (forthcoming). The Normative Profile of Knowledge by Acquaintance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

  • Brewer, Bill. (2019). Visual Experience, Revelation, and the Three Rs, in J. Knowles and T. Raleigh (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 277– 292.

  • Chalmers, David. (2003). The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief. In Q. Smith & A. Jokic (Eds.), Consciousness: New philosophical perspectives (pp. 1–54). Clarendon Press.

  • Campbell, John. (2019). Acquaintance as Grounded in Joint Attention, in J. Knowles and T. Raleigh (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 215– 226.

  • Conee, Earl. (1994). Phenomenal knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72, 136–150.

  • Duncan, Matt. (2017). Two Russellian Arguments for Acquaintance. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95, 3, p. 461-474.

  • Duncan, Matt. (2020). Knowledge of things. Synthese, 197, 3559–3592.

  • Duncan, Matt. (2021). Experience is Knowledge. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, 1, p. 106-129.

  • Duncan, Matt. (2023). Reasoning with Knowledge of Things. Philosophical Psychology, 36, 2, p. 270-291.

  • Fiocco, M. Oreste. (2017). Knowing Things in Themselves: Mind, Brentano and Acquaintance. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 94, pp. 332– 358.

  • Fumerton, Richard. (1995). Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Rowman and Littlefield.

  • Fumerton, Richard. (2005). Speckled Hens and Objects of Acquaintance. Philosophical Perspectives, 19, 121–138.

  • Fumerton, Richard. (2019). Acquaintance: The Foundation of Knowledge and Thought, in J. Knowles and T. Raleigh (eds.) Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 245-259.

  • Gertler, Brie. (2001). Introspecting phenomenal states. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 63(2), 305–328.

  • Gertler, Bie. (2011). Self-knowledge. Routledge.

  • Gertler, Brie. (2012). “Renewed Acquaintance” in D. Smithies and D. Stoljar (eds.) Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press, p. 89-123.

  • Giustina, Anna. (2022a). Introspective knowledge by acquaintance. Synthese, 200, 128.

  • Giustina, Anna. (2021). Introspection without Judgment, Erkenntnis, 86, p. 407-427.

  • Giustina, Anna. (2021). Introspective Acquaintance: An Integration Account, European Journal of Philosophy.

  • Hasan, Ali. (2013). Internalist Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma. Res Philosophica, 90, 2, pp. 171– 184.

  • Hasan, Ali and Fumerton, Richard. (2019). Knowledge by Acquaintance vs. Description, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

  • Iaquinto, Samuele and Spolaore, Giuseppe. (2019). Outline of a Logic of Knowledge of Acquaintance. Analysis, 79, 1, pp. 52– 61.

  • Kriegel, Uriah. (Forthcoming). What is knowledge by acquaintance? Noûs.

  • Kriegel, Uriah. (2024). Knowledge-by-acquaintance first. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research(2).

  • Markunas, Michael. (2025). Acquaintance, Knowledge, and Luck. Synthese.

  • Martin, M. G. F. (2001). Out of the Past: Episodic Memory as Retained Acquaintance, in C. Hoerl and T. McCormack (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 257– 284.

  • Martin, M. G. F. (2015). Old Acquaintance. Analytic Philosophy, 56, 1, pp. 1– 44.

  • McGinn, Colin. (2008). Consciousness as Knowingness. The Monist, 91, 2, pp. 237– 249.

  • Moss, Jessica. (2025). Knowledge-that is Knowledge-of. Philosophers’ Imprint.

  • Pallagrosi, Jacopo. (2025). The normativity of introspective acquaintance knowledge. Synthese, 205, 152.

  • Pallagrosi, Jacopo. (2026). The acquaintance trilemma: knowledge, consciousness, and mental qualities, Erkenntinis.

  • Pallagrosi, Jacopo, and Cortesi, Bruno. (2024). The stalemate between causal and constitutive accounts of introspective knowledge by acquaintance. Argumenta, 9(2), 433–451.

  • Pitt, David. (2019). Acquaintance and phenomenal concepts. In S. Coleman (Ed.), The knowledge argument. Cambridge University Press.

  • Poston, Ted. (2007). Acquaintance and the Problem of the Speckled Hen. Philosophical Studies, 132, pp. 331– 346.

  • Poston, Ted. (2010). Similarity and Acquaintance: A Dilemma. Philosophical Studies, 147, pp. 369– 378.

  • Ranalli, Chris. (2021). The Special Value of Experience. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, 1.

  • Ranalli, Chris. (forthcoming). Knowledge of Things and Aesthetic Testimony. Inquiry.

  • Tucker, Chris. (2016). Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification, in B. Coppenger and M. Bergmann (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 43– 60.

  • Wishon, Donovan. (2012). Perceptual Acquaintance and Informational Content, in Miguens and Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag, pp. 47– 89.

Acquaintance and Metaphysics

  • Balog, Katalin. (2012). “Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem” in S. Gozzano and C. Hill (eds.) New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 16-43.

  • Bigelow, John Christopher and Pargetter, Robert John. (1990). “Acquaintance with Qualia,” Theoria, 61, 3, p. 129-147.

  • Crane, Tim. (2012). Tye on Acquaintance and the Problems of Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84, pp. 190– 198.

  • Coleman, Sam. (2019). Natural acquaintance. In J. Knowles & T. Raleigh (Eds.), Acquaintance: New essays. Oxford University Press.

  • Duncan, Matt. (2018). Subjectivity as Self-Acquaintance. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25, 3-4 (2018): 88-111.

  • Dickie, Imogen. (2010). We Are Acquainted with Ordinary Things, in R. Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought, Oxford University Press.

  • Duncan, Matt. (2023). How You Know You’re Conscious: Illusionism and Knowledge of Things. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 14, 1, p. 185-205.

  • Gertler, Brie. (2019). “Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism,” in S. Coleman (ed.) The Knowledge Argument. Cambridge University Press, p. 62-86.

  • Giustina, Anna. (2024). Inner Acquaintance Theories of Consciousness. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 4.

  • Giustina, Anna. (2022). An Acquaintance alternative to Self-Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3831-3863.

  • Giustina, Anna. (forthcoming). Acquaintance and the Qualitative Character of Phenomenally Intentional States, Argumenta.

  • Goff, Philip. (2015). Real Acquaintance and Physicalism, in P. Coates and S. Coleman (eds.) Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press, p. 121-146.

  • Grzankowski, Alex and Tye, Michael. (2019). What Acquaintance Teaches, in J. Knowles and T. Raleigh (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 75– 94.

  • Hellie, Benji. (2007). Higher-order intentionality and higher-order acquaintance. Philosophical Studies, 134, 289–324.

  • Hellie, Benji (2009). Acquaintance, in T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans, and P. Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness, Oxford University Press.

  • Howell, Robert J. (2023). Self- Awareness and the Elusive Subject. Oxford University Press.

  • Levine, Joseph. (2019). Acquaintance is consciousness and consciousness is acquaintance. In J. Knowles & T. Raleigh (Eds.), In acquaintance: New essays. Oxford University Press.

  • Martin, M. G. F. (2019). Betwixt Feeling and Thinking: Two- Level Accounts of Experience, in J. Knowles and T. Raleigh (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 95– 126.

  • Nemirov, Laurence. (1990). Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance, in Lycan (ed.) Mind and Cognition, Oxford: Blackwe

  • Pautz, Adam. (2007). Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence. Philosophical Perspectives, 21, 1, pp. 495– 541.

  • Smith, David Woodruff. (1989). The Circle of Acquaintance: Perception, Consciousness, and Empathy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

  • Smith, David Woodruff. (2019). Acquaintance in an Experience of Perception- cum- Action, in J. Knowles and T. Raleigh (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 129– 144.

  • Tye, Michael. (2009). Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Williford, Kenneth. (2015). Representationalisms, subjective character, and self-acquaintance. In T. Metzinger and J. M. Windt (Eds.), Open MIND, 39:1–27. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.

  • Williford, Kenneth. (2019). Self- Acquaintance and Three Regress Arguments. ProtoSociology, 36, pp. 368– 412.

Acquaintance and Value

  • Atiq, Emad and Duncan, Matt. (2024). “I Feel Your Pain: Acquaintance and the Limits of Empathy,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, 3, p. 277-308.

  • Duncan, Matt. (2026). Present to the Mind: Acquaintance and Its Significance. Oxford University Press.

  • Duncan, Matt and Nahas, Hannah. (forthcoming). “Getting Acquainted with Art: Aesthetics and Knowledge of Things” in L. Campbell (ed.) Forms of Knowledge. Oxford University Press.

History of Acquaintance

  • Baldwin, Thomas. (2003). From Knowledge by Acquaintance to Knowledge by Causation, in N. Griffin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Cambridge University Press, pp. 420– 448.

  • Bluck, R. S. (1963). ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance’ in Plato’s Theaetetus. Mind 72, 286, pp. 259– 263.

  • Eames, Elizabeth Ramsden. (1969). Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Knowledge. London: Routledge.

  • Faria, Paulo. (2010). Memory as Acquaintance with the Past: Some Lessons from Russell, 1912– 1914. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy, 51, 121, pp. 149– 172.

  • Kremer, Michael. (2015). Acquaintance, Analysis, and Knowledge of Persons in Russell, in B. Linsky and D. Wishon (eds.), Acquaintance, Knowledge, and Logic: New Essays on Bertrand Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy. Stanford: CSLI Publications, pp. 129– 152.

  • Kriegel, Uriah. (2024). Beatrice Edgell’s Myth of the Given. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 32, 3, pp. 587– 605.

  • Milkov, Nikolay. (2001). The History of Russell’s Concepts ‘Sense-Data’ and ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance.’ Archiv Fuer Begriffsgechichte, 43, pp. 221– 231.

  • Proops, Ian. (2014). Russellian Acquaintance Revisited. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 52, 4, pp. 779– 811.

  • Smith, Nicholas D. (1979). Knowledge by Acquaintance and ‘Knowing What’ in Plato’s Republic. Dialogue, 18, 3, pp. 281– 288.

  • Textor, Mark. (2024). Acquaintance, Presentation and Judgment: From Brentano to Russell and Back Again. Inquiry, 67, pp. 262– 288.

  • Wishon, Donovan. (2017). Russellian Acquaintance and Frege’s Puzzle. Mind, 126, 502, pp. 321– 370.

  • Wishon, Donovan. (2018). Russell on Introspection and Self- Knowledge, in R. Wahl (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Bertrand Russell. London: Bloomsbury Academic, pp. 256– 285.

  • Wishon, Donovan and Linsky, Bernard. (2015). Acquaintance, Knowledge, and Logic: New Essays on Bertrand Russell’s “The Problems of Philosophy.” Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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